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In the SupreDie Court of the 
State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its R01\D 
COMMISSION; D. H. WHITTENBURG, 
Chairman, and LAYTON MAXFIELD and 
LORENZO J. BOTT, members of the State 
Road Commission, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOLEY, INCORPO'RATED, a corporation, 
et al, 
Defendants, 
and 
BOYD W. CALTO·N and MARY CALTON, 
Intervenors and Respondents. 
\ CASE 
I NO. 8274 
Brief of Intervenors and Respondents on 
Intermediate Appeal 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because we do not believe the appellant's state~ment 
of facts properly presents the intervenors' position in this 
intermediate appeal, we shall restate them in the light of 
the intervenors' theory of the case. 
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2 
The issue on this intermediate appeal is whether, when 
the State of Utah actually takes property for a public use 
in connection with a highway project, and brings eminent 
domain proceedings against some of the property owners 
along said project, a property. owner whose land is in fact 
taken, though neither he nor the particular property is 
named in the complaint, may properly intervene in that 
action to have his constitutional right to just compensation 
for the taking determined. 
State Highway Project No. 1524 involved the widen-
ing of U.S. Highway No. 50--89-91, between the cities of 
American Fork and Lehi, Utah. In connection with the 
acquisition of rights of way for this project, the State of 
Utah, on February 17, 1954, filed this action in the District 
Court of Utah County to condemn certain parcels of land 
along this right of way. These are shown on the Exhibits 
to the complaint on file herein and on page 3 of the appel-
lant's brief. 
On July 21, 1954, the intervenors filed in this condem-
nation action a motion and plea in intervention wherein it 
is alleged, among other things, that the intervenors hold a 
leasehold estate in certain real property along this right of 
way, that the intervenors were in open, continuous and un-
interrupted possession of this leasehold estate at the time 
of the construction of this project and during the time of 
this action, and that the State of Utah, in connection with 
this road project, and without notice to the intervenors, 
without opportWlity for them to be heard, and without due 
process of law, entered upon a portion of this leasehold es-
tate to the exclusion of the intervenors. The plea in inter-
vention prays that the state be compelled to compensate 
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3 
the intervenors for the portion of the leasehold estate thus 
taken and for damage to the remainder of that estate. 
The trial court granted the intervenors' motion and 
this Court allowed intermediate appeal by the state from 
that order. For the purposes of this intermediate appeal, 
we take it that the facts alleged in the plea in intervention 
are assumed to be true. 
The arguments in the state's brief fall logically in two: 
first, that this is not a proper cause for intervention, and 
second, that the intervenors are, under the authority of 
Hjorth v. Whittenburg, et al. (1952), Utah'------
241 P. 2d 907, limited in their choice of forums to the Board 
of Examiners and the Legislature of the State of Utah. We 
shall present our argument in these two divisions. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I: WHERE THE STATE, IN CONNECTION 
WITH A ROAD CO·NSTRUUCTION PROJECT, BRINGS 
AN EMII'JENT DO·MAIN ACTION AGAINST CERTAIN 
PROPERTY OWNERS, THAT PERSON WHOSE PRO~P­
ERTY HAS IN FACT BEEN TAKEN, TH!OUGH NEI-
THER HE NOR HIS PROPERTY HAS BE.EN NAMED 
IN THE EMINENT DO·MAIN PROCEEDINGS, MAY 
PR01PERLY INTERVENE IN THE ACTION TO HAVE 
HIS DAMAGES FOR THE TAKING AND' CO-NSEQUEN-
TIAL DAMAGES JUDICIALLY DETERMINED. 
POINT II: A PROPERTY OWNER WHOSE PRO·P-
ERTY HAS BEEN TAKEN BY THE STATE O·F UTAH) 
WITHOUT DUE PRO·CESS OF LAW, IS NOT LIMITED 
TO ADMINISTRATIVE OR LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHERE THE STATE, IN CONNECTION WITH A 
ROAD CONSTRUCTION PROJECT, BRINGS AN EMI-
NENT' DOMAIN ACTION AGAINST CERTAIN PROP-
ERTY OWNERS, THAT PERSON WHOSE PRO,PERTY 
HAS IN FACf BEEN TAKEN, THOUGH NEITHER HE 
NO~R·\, HliS- PROPERTY HAS' BEEN, NAMED. IN THE 
EMINENT .. DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS, MAY PROPERLY 
INTEVRENE IN, THE ACTIO-N· TO HA V1E DAMAGE8 
FOR THE TAKING AND CONSE.QUENTIAL DAMAGES 
JUDICIALLY DETERMINED. 
It is urged. that nei~ther intervention of right nor per-
missive intervention lies in the case at bar. From our view 
of intervenors' theory of. their. cause, this Court need not, 
on the facts before it, decide whether intervention of right 
is- available to.· intervenors. If we concede that the inter-
venors . were .. admitted to the case. on discretion. of the trial 
court, there was: no abuse of its discretion in so doing. 
Rule· 24(b), URCP, provides in· part: "Upon timely· 
application anyone· may be permitted· to intervene in an 
action: * * *· * (2) when an applicant's claim or 
defense and the main action have a question of law or fact 
in common *' * * *~'' This is one of the grounds for 
permissive· intervention. 
On pages 4-5 of its brief, the state sets forth the issues 
of the case ru; being " ( 1) the public necessity of the taking; 
( 2.) value, of . property taken; and ( 3) severance damage." 
Those:ar.eprecisely the. issues that.we~ in our poor way, are· 
endeavoring to place before the trial court as respects the 
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5' 
intervenors' estate in land. taken by the state~ It is urged 
that the intervenors' claim would- have to be severed for 
trial. We -confess that we thought that was the usual man-
ner of trying. eminent domain cases involving highway pro-
jects. The last sentence of Section 78-34-6, Utah Code An-
notated 1953, would appear to contemplate this possibility, 
and we note that-what is denominated the main case seemlS 
to be a consolidated action against approximately six dif-
ferent defendants whose property, not necessarily adjacent 
to each other's, is distributed over ·a linear distance some-
thing. in excess of two miles. We cannot refain from re-
marking that it would be interesting to observe the trial 
of the main case in toto before a single jury. 
On page 5 of the state's brief it is stated that the is-
sues presented by the intervenors are "(1) whether· the 
Road Commission's entry (upon intervenors' leasehold es-
tate) was privileged and if not (2) what damage was done" 
to it. We are at a loss to find where this matter of· "privi-
leged" entry came in. Surely the Attorney General would 
not urge that the state, taking possession of property for 
a public use without bringing a condemnation action, ac-
quires a "privilege"! On page 2 of'the state's brief it is al-
leged that the road commlssion acquired from the f~hol­
der by deed the portion of land taken. Apart from the 
fact that this is a gratuitous~ unsworn statement not sub-
ject to cross examination, it should be pleaded and proved 
if it is considered·. as material. The facts- thus. stated are 
certainly not beforethe Court on this-appeaL Inany·event, 
a leasehold estate- is such an interest in land as to require 
condemnation. Korf v. Fleming; (1948), 237 Iowa 501, 32 
NW 2d 85, 3 ALR· 2d 270. An easement may be condemned 
upon an easement. \Vhiterocks Irrigation Co. v. Moose-
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man et al., (1914) 45 Utah 79, 141 Pac. 459, and the statute 
expressly provides that anyone having an interest in land 
named in the complaint may appear and defend, whether 
or not he is named in the complaint. 78-34-7, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. 
Although neither the fee-holder nor the land involved 
herein were named in the complaint, we respectfully subrmt 
that intervenors are properly before the Court to determine 
the questions of the taking of their property and their right 
to just compensation. Other remedies were available to 
the intervenors, but this matter will be considered under 
the next point of argument. 
POINT II 
A PROPERTY OWNER WHOSE PR01PERTY HAS 
BEEN TAKEN BY THE STATE OF UTAH WITHOUT 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW IS NOT LIMITED TO ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE OR LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES. 
Upon oral argument of the mortion to intervene and 
under Foint Til of the state's brief, the appeUant urges that 
the intervenors are limited in seeking their remedy to pre--
senting their cause to the Board of Examiners and the leg-
Islature of this state. Appellant relies upon the case of 
Hjorth v. Whittenburg, et al, supra, as their authority for 
this proposition. 
We respectfully sub1nit that that case is no such au-
thority. In the Hjorth case, the property owner sought 
consequential damages only, and from the members of the 
road commission personally. The State of Utah was not 
even a party. In the case at bar, the intervenors are seek-
ing just comlpensation for propellty taken in addition to con-
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7 
sequential damages, and they are seeking this remedy 
against the State of Utah itself. The Hjorth case stands 
for the proposition that where the members of the road 
commission act in good faith and without negligence in ex-
ercising the authority of the State of Utah, they cannot be 
held liable personally for damages caused by such action. 
That rule of law has nothing to do with the case be:Eore 
this Court. The intervenors are seeking in this action to 
compel the state itself, not the members of its administra-
tive body, to give them just compensation for property ta-
ken for public use. This right is guaranteed the interven-
ors by Article I, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution, and 
the procedure whereby the interests of persons in the po-
sition of the intervenors are protected against the state 
have been set forth in Chapter 34, Title '78, Utah Code An-
n)otated 1953. The state, so far as intervenors are con-
cerned, has complied with none of the provisions of this 
legisiartive act. Strange indeed would he the rule of law 
which permitted the State of Utah to benefit in any man-
ner from its failure to abide by its organic act and legisla-
tion adopted pursuant thereto. 
True, the state is a trespasser so far as intervenors 
are concerned, but intervenors are not seeking relief for a 
trespass. Intervenors do not attempt in this action to sue 
the State of Utah in tort. They seek merely to compel the 
State of Utah to condemn tbeir property according to due 
process of law. We submit that the case of Campbell Build-
ing Company v. State Road Commission (1937), 95 Utah 
242, 70 P. 2d, 857, is therefore also not applicable to the 
case at the bar. 
Certainly the intervenors could have chosen to pre-
sent their claim to the Board of Examiners. They could 
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8 
have sought an injunction against the state and the mem-
bers of the road commission upon commencement of the 
project. They could have proceeded in court against the 
contractor in trespass, and, on the theory of negligence, we 
believe they could have proceeded against the members of 
the road com~sion individually for acts of their agents, 
under the authority of the Hjjorth case. Intervenors have 
elected to compel the state to condemn their property. Un-
wise as this election may be, we submit that it lies with 
the intervenors, not the state. 
It is believed that intervenors could have proceeded 
against the members of the road commission for a writ 
of mandate to ·compel them to condemn their property in-
terest. 34 A. J. 937, "Mandamus" Sec. 161. This also they 
chosen not to do. This would, we submit, have been a waste-
ful and circuitous route to the same end sought through 
intervention. 
The nub of the state~s defense to this intervention is 
this: it is endeavoring to hide behind sovereign immunity 
to avoid paying just compensation. for property it has taken 
by virtue of its sovereign power. 
We do not believe intervenors' action sounds in tort. 
Rather, it is brought to enforce a right given the~ by Ar-
ticle I, Section 22, Utah Constitution. It is our position 
that this article is self-executing, and that if necessary, we 
could have brought a separate action against the state to 
enforce this right. Milhous v. State Highway Department, 
(1940), 194 S. C. 33, 8 SE 2d 852, 128 ALR 1186. 
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CONCLUSION 
Upon this intermediate appeal the state has not raised 
two questions of law that are inherent in this action; wheth-
er a leasehold interest is sufficient interest in land to be the 
subject matter of condemnation, and ·whether, if this 
be so, possession under an unrecorded lease is sufficient 
notice to the state to a void the effect of the recording stat-
ute. On this lastter issue, we respectfully submit that there 
is no reason for holding that the state is not bound by the 
general rule announced in Toland v. Corey (1890) 6 Utah 
392, 24 Pac. 190. Should this Court uphold the ruling of 
the trial court now before it for review, then, in order to 
avoid multiplicity of appeals, these issues ought to be dis-
posed of. 
We further respectfully submit that the state, in its 
exercise of sovereign power to take a ·citizen's property for 
a public use, is not immune from suit to determine the ·mat-
ter of just compensation for such taking. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HEBER GRANT IVINS 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN 
Attorneys for Intervenors 
and Respondents 
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